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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS
[Mr. Harry Weinberger, of the New York Bar, has drawn our attention
to the following from the New York Law Journal-Ed.]
Evidence-Present and Past Recollection of Witness-MemorandaModification of New York Rule.-Where, in the Absence of Present Recollection of a Witness, a Memorandum of Past Recollection Would Have Been
Admissible Had a Few Preliminary Questions Been Asked, It Was Error to
Have Rejected It.-If testimony of witnesses as to what they saw and heard
at the performance of the play after the indictment had been excluded, since
the evidence shows that these performances were exactly the same as during
the time covered by the indictment, it would have been error.
COURT OF APPEALS
Decided January 21, 1925.
People of the State of New York, respondent, v. Harry Weinberger, Rudolph
Schildkraut, Esther Stockton, Virginia MacFadden, Marjorie Stewart,
Irwin J. Adler, Mae Berland, Sam Jaffe, Morris Carnovsky, Dorothee
Nolan, Aldeah Wise, Lillian Taiz and James Meighan, defendantsappellants.
Appeal by the defendants from a judgment of the Appellate Division,
First Department, affirming a judgment of the Court of General Sessions
entered upon a verdict of a jury convicting defendants of violating section
1140-a of Penal Law.
Samuel Seabury, Harry Weinberger, attorneys of counsel for appellants;
James Garret Wallace for respondent.
Where defendant, who was charged with the production of an immoral and indecent play, testified that from the date named in the indictment no change in the play was made "either in the business or the
words," and then offered in evidence a transcript of the play, after
swearing that it was copied by his secretary from the "actor's script"
and that he compared it "word for word with the play as played from
February 19th, and every day thereafter," and the court rejected it, held
that as the transcript would have been admissible had a few preliminary
questions been asked of the witness as to his present recollection, and
as the transcript offered represented a record of the witness's past
memory more reliable as evidence than testimony based upon his present memory could possibly be; and further, as the transcript, if admitted, might have led the jury to draw different inferences had it
accepted it as correct, it was error for the court to reject it.
Andrews, 3., dissenting with opinion, in which Crane, J., concurs.
McLaughlin, J., absent.
Lehman, J.-The defendant Weinberger, as manager, and the other defendants as actors and performers, have participated in the production of a
draama known as "The God of Vengeance." Because of such participation
they have been indicted on the charge of "advertising, giving, presenting and
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participating in an obscene, indecent, immoral and impure drama, play, exhibition, show and entertainment . . . which tends and would tend to the
corruption of the morals of youth or others."
At the trial the People presented the testimony of witnesses who saw
the play when it was produced during the time set forth in the indictment.
These witnesses described from memory the actions and gestures of the
actors on the stage and the substance of the words of the play which they
heard and, so far as they remembered, the exact words. The defendants
produced no witnesses who contradicted or added to the testimony of the
People's witnesses. Their counsel merely cross-examined the People's witnesses and upon the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses the jury concluded
that the play as produced was obscene and the defendants have been convicted of the crime for which they were indicted.
Upon this appeal we may not pass upon whether the production was
obscene and immoral, nor may we consider whether the evidence presented
to the jury was sufficient to enable the jury to pass upon the question submitted to it and supports its conclusion; but one of the exceptions of the
defendants to the exclusion of evidence offered by them raises the question
of whether they were precluded from presenting to the jury evidence which
might have afforded a more certain basis for a conclusion and which might
have led to a different result. "
After the testimony of the People's. witnesses was presented in regard
to what they had seen and heard when the play was presented, the defendant
Weinberger testified that from February 19, the date named in the indictment, no change in the play was made "either in the business or the words."
He then offered in evidence a transcript of the play. He testified that the
transcript was copied by his secretary from the "actor's script," and that he
compared it "word for word with the play as played from February 19, and
every day thereafter." The transcript was excluded upon an objection for
which no ground was stated, but the context shows with reasonable clearness that the objection was understood to be based on the fact that it was
a copy made after the indictment was found. It is now sought to sustain
the ruling not on that ground, but on the ground that the recollection of the
witness as to the words and action of the play should first have been exhausted before a transcript of the actor's script could be admitted.
The rule that the present recollection of a witness must be exhausted
before a record of his past recollection may be admitted in evidence, though
applied in New York and the Federal courts, has not been universally accepted or approved. There are times when the record of a past recollection,
if it exists, is more trustworthy and desirable than a present recollection of
greater or less vividness (Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 738), and that
is clearly the case here. The charge in the present case is that the production of the play was obscene and immoral, not that the play itself was immoral, and the testimony which was relevant upon that charge concerns
rather what was said and done on the stage than what was written in the
"actors' script," but it can hardly be supposed that any witness would be
able to remember merely from attending a performance the exact words
that were said and which accompanied the gestures which it is claimed were
suggestive of evil. The suggestiveness of actions or gestures depends in
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large measure upon the words which accompany them. A change of a word
here or there may change the meaning and effect of a scene; an understanding
of the meaning of a scene or play based upon a study of the exact words
used may be different f'rom the meaning which would be gathered from a
recital of the recollection of a witness as to a performance of the scene.
The jury must form its own conclusion as to the immoral tendency of the
production, at least in part, from a narration of what has occurred on the
stage; yet that narration must at times be incomplete, for narration of past
events based on present recollection is incomplete and it must be colored by
the impressions gathered by the witness, for all narration is so colored. It
cannot have the accuracy of a photograph, yet it should be as accurate as it
can be made. It is important, then, that the exact words which have been
spoken should be laid before the jury. No reasonable man could suppose
that the exact words could be obtained from a witness' recollection as well
as they could be obtained from a transcript of the play checked up by the
witness at some performance. To ask the witness whether he can remember
the exact words of a whole play would be either a useless formality or
result in obtaining evidence less reliable than could be obtained from the
introduction of the transcript. As well might we refuse to receive in evidence
a copy which has been compared with a lost document until the person who
testified to the comparison has first exhausted his memory as to the contents
of the lost document. A rule of evidence should not be permitted to become
a mere fetish; the evidence offered would unquestionably be competent if a
few preliminary questions had been asked of the witness as to his present
recollection; the asking of these questions would have been useless and
could have elicited no answers that would have helped the jury. The transcript represents a record of the witness's past memory of the play more
reliable as evidence than testimony based upon his present memory could
possibly be, and it should therefore have been received, especially since no
suggestion was made that the usual formal questions should first be asked.
Perhaps only the words of the drama should have been admitted and the
stage directions excluded, but no objection was made on this ground or on
the ground that the preliminary questions were not asked. We do not think
that the defendants should have been required to request the opposing party
to make the objections to the testimony more definite, for the objection was
not a mere general objection and the parties must have understood that it
was based on the fact that the copy was made after the indictment. Under
such circumstances the exclusion constitutes error even if the evidence was
not made at the time competent, since it could be made so (Tooley v.
Bacon, 70 N. Y. 34). We do not overlook the fact that at the trial the
defendants' attorney assumed the attitude that he did not dispute the testimony as to what was said and done, but claimed that no inference of immorality should be drawn from it. We have compared the oral testimony
with the transcript offered of the actors' script and we feel-that the picture
of what had occurred takes on in some respects a different aspect if the words
used in the transcript are substituted for the words which People's witnesses
remember, and different inferences might have been drawn if the jury had
accepted as correct the transcript which was offered.
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The defendants also urge that the trial judge erred in excluding the
testimony of witnesses as to what they saw and heard at performances held
after the indictment, since the evidence shows that these performances were
exactly the same as during the time covered by the indictment. If su,:h
testimony had been refused it would have been error, but we find that the
evidence rejected was rather the opinion of the witnesses as to the moral
'alue of the performance than the narration of what the performance consisted of.
The judgments should be reversed and a new trial granted.

Andrews, J. (dissenting).-I dissent.
It is our duty to affirm where the ruling of the court be!ow is in fact
right whatever the ground upon which it may be placed. The exclusion of
the script in this case was technically correct (Nat. Ulster Co. Bank v. Madden, 114 N. Y. 280; Russell v. H. R. R. R., 17 N. Y. 134; People v. McLaughlin,
150 N. Y. 365, 392; Vicksburg & M. R. R. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99; 1 Wigmore
on Evidence, 835, where the New York rule is stated; Chamberlayne on
Evidence, sec 3507; Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, sec. 883; Greenleaf
on Evidence, sec. 437; 10 Ruling Case Law, 909).
A reversal in this case means that a memorandum prepared by a third
party with regard to a transaction stating the words used and the actions
accompanying the words may be properly received in evidence if a witness
states that it correctly represents, those words and actions. Here the complaint is not so much of the language of the play as of what was actually done
on the stage. The script is filled with stage directions. At one place, for
instance, two characters are said to embrace. At another one runs her
fingers through a girl's hair and buries her face in it. Nothing could be
more innocent. A description, however, of what actually occurred by' witnesses for the People does or may put a different construction upon the scene.
Yet we are about to say that the memorandum is evidence on this question
which the jury may consider.
It is very possible that had it been admitted we might refuse to reverse
a judgment on that ground alone. Then we might say that the appellant
should have called the attention of the trial judge to the precise objection
to the evidence. Where. however, the memorandum was excluded, this rule
does not apply.
I think the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Hiscock, Ch.J.; Cardozo and Pound, J. J., concur with Lehman, J.; Andrews, J., reads dissenting opinion, in which Crane, J., concurs; McLaughlin,
. judgments reversed,
etc.
J., absent.
-N. Y. Law Jour., Feb. 3, 1925.

